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ABSTRACT
LABOR MIGRATION AND TRADE PATTERNS 
IN THE PRESENCE OF AGE COMPOSITION DIFFERENCES 
ACROSS COUNTRIES:
AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ANALYSIS 
Uyar, All Emre
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof Dr. Serdar Sayan
September 2000
This study examines various effects of population growth differentials across 
countries by using a two country overlapping generations (OLG) general equilibrium 
model and shows that the resulting differences in age composition of populations 
provide not only a basis for trade but also incentives for international migration of 
labor. The analysis starts by considering autarky equilibria of the countries that are 
assumed to be identical except for population growth rates initially, and shows that 
the country with the lower (higher) population growth rate will have higher (lower) 
capital per worker, wage rate and lifetime utility at all times. The cases of free trade 
and international mobility of labor are then simulated for a comparative 
investigation.
The simulations with the considered migration scheme reveal that the steady 
state value of migration rate equalizes the post-migration population growth rates in 
both coimtries. When trade is also taken into consideration, the results indicate that 
the country that is attractive to the migrants would prefer trade to migration, if it is a 
large country relative to the other. If both countries are equal in size, on the other 
hand, trade turns out to be Pareto-inferior to migration for the host country, with 
autarky being Pareto-superior to both trade and migration.
Keywords : Overlapping Generations, General Equilibrium, Age Composition 
Differences, Migration, Trade.
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ÖZET
ÜLKELER ARASI YAŞ KOMPOZİSYONU 
FARKLILIKLARI DURUMUNDA İŞGÜCÜ GÖÇÜ VE TİCARETİN YÖNÜ: 
BİR EŞANLI NESİLLER ANALİZİ
Uyar, Ali Emre
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Serdar Sayan
Eylül 2000
Bu çalışma, ülkeler arası nüfus büyüme farklannm çeşitli etkilerini, iki ülkeli 
bir eşanlı nesiller genel denge modeli çerçevesinde incelemekte ve bu farklann 
sonucu olarak nüfüslann yaş kompozisyonlan arasında oluşan eşitsizliğin hem 
ticaret, hem de uluslararası işgücü göçü için temel oluşturduğunu göstermektedir. 
Analiz, başlangıç anında nüfus artış oranlan dışında birbirinin tıpatıp aynı koşullarla 
karşı karşıya olan iki ülke ekonomisinin zaman içindeki değişimini, birbiriyle temas 
etmedikleri durumdan yola çıkarak yapılmaktadır. Kurulan model, daha sonra, 
serbest ticaret ve uluslararası işgücü hareketlerini de gözönüne alacak biçimde 
simule edilmiş ve değişik senaryolardan elde edilen sonuçlar karşılaştınimıştır.
İncelediğimiz göç simulasyonlan, göç oranlannm durgun hal değerlerinin 
göç-sonrası nüfus artış oranlannı eşitlediğini göstermektedir. Ticaret de göz önüne 
alındığında, göçmen işgücü için çekici olan ülkenin diğerine göre büyük ülke olması 
durumunda, fiilen göç almak yerine ticareti tercih ettiği görülmektedir. Öte yandan, 
iki ülkenin eşit büyüklükte olması halinde ev sahibi ülke için göç, ticarete kıyasla 
Pareto-baskm çıkmakta; buna karşın, kapalı ekonomi durumu hem ticaret hem de 
göçmen kabulüne Pareto-baskm olmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler : Eşanlı Nesiller, Genel Denge, Yaş Kompozisyonu Farklan, Göç, 
Ticaret.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Population aging in developed coimtries and its possible economic 
consequences have attracted considerable attention in the previous decade. Aging of 
the baby-boom generations, coupled with declining fertility rates of new generations, 
causes dramatic changes in the demographic structures of these countries. Projections 
by United Nations show that the average share o f the elderly (over 65) population in 
OECD countries will double in the next 50 years. Possible consequences of such 
substantial increases in dependency ratios include variations in the values of many 
economic variables such as labor supply, saving rates, real wages, returns to capital 
and hence, capital per worker, along with their implications on public pension and 
health care systems.
The likely consequences of this transition have been explored by many 
researchers, such as Auerbach et al. (1989), Hviding and Merette (1998), Ken9 and 
Sayan (2000), Fougere and Merette (1999), with somewhat diverging results on the 
extent of various effects. Aside from these, the decline in young to old ratios in the 
populations of developed countries and the resulting increase in wages and living 
standards is expected to induce labor migration out of the developing countries. 
While this is already an important issue (for example between USA and Mexico, the 
EU and surrounding countries, in particular Turkey), the current demographic trend 
is likely to increase pressures for increased mobility of labor across borders in the 
future.
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The first aim of this thesis is to explore the role o f differences in age 
compositions and growth of population rates in neighboring nations as a possible 
source of migration. For this purpose, we consider two economies that are initially 
the same in every aspect except for the population growth rate and show that this 
alone is enough to induce differences in wage rates and utilities, thereby providing 
incentives for workers from a country to migrate to another. The model we use is a 2- 
country, infinite horizon, OLG model with 2 goods and 2 factors of production 
(capital and labor).
Our next aim is to model a migration scheme and investigate its effects on 
both countries by placing a special emphasis on finding a steady state value for the 
migration rate. We also compare the steady state in each country with and without 
migration.
A related issue that we address concerns the relationship between trade and 
migration, which is indeed an old and well debated subject. As R.J. Ruffin (1984, p. 
266) puts it:
...Heckscher (1919), Meade (1951), Lemer (1952), Samuelson (1949), and 
many others have suggested that trade is a substitute for factor movements. 
The basis for this suggestion is the factor endowment theory of international 
trade pioneered by Ohlin and Heckscher...
...When factor price equalization holds [Lemer (1952), Samuelson (1949)], 
trade is a perfect substitute for factor movements.
Yet, there is ample evidence that developed countries heavily favor free trade 
over free migration of labor.’ We investigate possible reasons underlying the 
behavior of developed countries by incorporating free trade into our model, and then 
comparing results (especially the welfare implications for the host country) across 
the scenarios with free movement of labor and free trade.
The plan of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 contains a literature review. 
Chapter 3 describes the model and reports simulation results for both countries under 
the autarky conditions. Chapter 4 and 5 discuss trade and migration scenarios, 
respectively, and present findings. Comparison of different scenarios and concluding 
remarks are presented in Chapter 6.
 ^ Wellish and Walz (1998) and Razin and Sadka (1995) propose a justification for this 
behavior, by showing that the migration can actually be more costly to the host country.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The effects of population aging on various economic variables, especially 
those related to social security, have been the focus of many studies starting from the 
previous decade. The initial studies in the area such as Hagemann and Nicoletti 
(1989) employed partial equilibrium methods or used projections that ignore the 
demographically induced changes in many related variables, such as real wages.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) developed a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium OLG model to study the effects of population aging, as well as numerous 
other economic phenomena. Based on life-cycle theory of saving behavior, their 
model investigated rational responses of households to perfectly foreseen changes in 
current and future wages, interest and tax rates by allowing for 55 overlapping 
generations to be alive in any given period within the model horizon. Later, 
Auerbach et. al. (1989) slightly modified this model to allow for 75 overlapping 
generations and introduced bequest behavior, technological change, endogeneity of 
government expenditures with respect to age composition of the population and open 
economy features to study the effects of projected demographic changes in the 
United States, Japan, Germany and Sweden over the 1985-2050 period. Their 
simulations showed that, as population ages, the consumption tax rates and national 
saving rates would decline in all countries, while the social security contribution 
rates and real wages would increase. Their main finding is that the studies that do not 
use general equilibrium models overestimate the burden of population aging by
ignoring the effects of the increase in real wages. However, the effects o f population 
aging on national saving rates, real wage rates and current accounts as well as the 
possible welfare costs and the problems regarding the distribution across cohorts 
remain significant even in a general equilibrium framework.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) model was later modified in many directions 
to capture more realistic features of economies tmder consideration. Perraudin and 
Pujol (1991), for example, incorporated open economy features with 2 different 
kinds (export and non-tradeable) goods into the Auerbech-Kotlikoff framework; 
Broer et al (1994) introduced probability of dying; Ken9 and Sayan (2000) extended 
the model to investigate demographic shock transmission. Hyving and Merette 
(1998) and Fougere and Merette (1999). Hyving and Merette (1998) used an 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) type model to study the effects of population aging in 
seven OECD covmtries in the period between 1954-2082. Their results are similar to 
that of Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) and suggest substantial increases in wage income 
tax rates and decreases in capital per worker, real return on capital, national saving 
rate and real output per capita. Fougere and Merette (1999) modified this model to 
include endogenous human-capital formation. Their results show that investment in 
human capital offsets some of the effects of population aging in the long-run, even 
reversing the effect in the case of real output per capita.
A formal treatment of the two-sector OLG models is relatively (and 
surprisingly) new. While models that include two or more sectors have been used 
sparingly since Calvo (1978) and Reichlin (1986) who used models with fixed- 
proportions production technologies to investigate some local properties of 2 sector 
OLG models, Galor (1992) was the first to formally develop a 2-sector OLG model
and establish conditions to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a perfect foresight 
equilibrium path. In Galor (1992), one of the goods is used for consumption only 
while the other is being used only as capital. The households that live for 2 periods 
get utility from consuming the consumption good and buy the other good only for 
investment purposes. The investment good that is produced in a period is then used 
as the capital stock of the next period. Galor (1992) shows that under certain 
assumptions,^ there exists a globally unique perfect-foresight equilibrium.
Extensions of Galor (1992) model include Farmer (1997) and Guillo (1999). 
Farmer (1997) modifies the model to include heterogenous capital and static price 
expectations of agents. Guillo (1999) uses the Galor (1992) type production and 
capital formation to investigate the effect of relative factor intensities on the 
relationship between the terms of trade and the capital stock. The study shows, 
contrary to a common result in the literature, that, under certain conditions, an import 
sector growing faster than the export sector is not required for a country’s terms of 
trade and capital per worker to move in the same direction.
The literature on migration is vast and diverse addressing such issues as 
incentives for migration, welfare effects of migration on both countries, comparison 
of temporary and permanent migration, comparison o f migrants and native workers, 
etc. Here, we mainly concentrate on the studies that use general equilibrium OLG 
models, a part of the literature led by numerous contributions by Oded Galor.
 ^Assumptions regarding the production and utility functions may be satisfied by many well-behaving 
functions. Additional assumptions include investment good being capital intensive, old age 
consumption being a normal good and savings increasing with increasing real interest rate.
Calor (1986) establishes a 2-factor OLG model with two countries that are 
exactly the same in every aspect, except for the time preferences of their residents. 
The main results of the paper can be summarized as:
(1) Depending on whether the countries imder or over invest with respect to 
the golden rule level, the difference in time preferences across countries may induce 
labor migration from one country to another or even bilateral migration. Calor (1986, 
p. 1) explains it as : “ ...labor migrates from the high (low) to the low (high) time 
preference country if both countries under (over) invest relative to the Golden 
Rule.”^
(2) The comparison of wages in both countries are rmaffected by migration. 
More specifically, wages in the source country remain at its autarky level while the 
wage rate in the host country always stays above that value. Therefore, the incentive 
to migrate persists even after the start of migration, resulting in the migration of 
whole population of one country migrating to the other.
(3) As a result of the international labor migration, the natives of the host 
country are made worse off (in terms of lifetime utility) while the non-migrants in 
the source country are at least as well off.
The last result is particularly important since it is contradicting with the 
results in classical trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin) which requires that international
 ^ As explained in Karayalcin (1999), this means migration from impatient country to the patient 
country if both countries are dynamically efficient.
factor movements (which are thought to be substitutes of international trade) benefit 
both of the participating countries.
Karayalcin (1999) uses the same model as Galor (1986) to study temporary 
migration, i.e., the workers migrate in the first period of their lives and turn back in 
the second period. He concludes that the wages in both countries are affected from 
such a migration, resulting in a steady state which does not require the whole 
population of a country to migrate to the other. The welfare effects on both countries 
remain the same as Galor (1986). Karayalcin (1999) also modifies the Galor (1986) 
model to contain an immobile factor of production (land) which again results in a 
steady state migration rate that is less than 1 implying that not all the workers in a 
country migrate to the other.
On the other hand, Geide (1998) consideres two countries, one of which 
depends on personal savings while the other one uses a social security system, and 
concludes that this may provide incentives for migration. These incentives also 
remain on the long run, causing the migration of whole population o f a country to the 
other.
Other studies about migration using OLG models include Galor and Stark 
(1991), which use a similar model to show that incentives to migrate can arise from a 
difference in the countries’ level of technology instead of time-preferences as in 
Galor (1986), and Kochhar (1992) which endogenizes labor-leisure choice in the 
Galor (1986) model.
Galor and Stark (1990, 1991), also using OLG frameworks, attribute a 
positive value to the probability of migrants’ return home. The probability of return 
migration provides incentives for migrants to save more and work more (as result of 
their intertemporal utility maximization) than the natives of the host country. When 
the ex-ante probability of return is not realized, the migrants end up with a higher 
income than the natives, thereby explaining why migrants usually are more 
successful economically than native-boms in real life. Chiswick (1986a, 1986b) 
show that this is indeed the case for the U.S.
Djajic and Milbome (1988) and Djajic (1989) also use the approach of taking 
workers as utility-maximizing individuals who solve intertemporal utility 
maximization problems to make their decision about migration and length of their 
stay abroad, while Ethier (1985) and Rivera-Batiz (1983) deal with temporary 
migration in a guest-worker system.
As explained in the introduction section, the substitubility of international 
trade and international factor movements is a result o f the factor price equalization 
property of the fundamental Hecksher-Ohlin model. This is suggested by many 
researchers such as Ohlin (1929), Heckscher (1919), Meade (1951), Lemer (1952), 
Samuelson (1949). Since then, factor-price equalization has been critisized on 
various grounds and it is has been argued in such as Markusen (1983) and Wong 
(1995) that trade and migration are complements rather than substitutes. Razin and 
Sadka (1997) compare different trade models that result in either substitution or 
complementarity between trade and labor mobility and explain the key features of 
models that are responsible for contradicting results.
Some studies show that the host country in an international migration scheme 
may prefer trade even if the factor price equalization holds. Wellisch and Walz 
(1997) argue that one feature that from missing in the Hecksher-Ohlin framework is 
the existence of the modem welfare state and this may cause underestimation of costs 
of migration to the host country. Their results indicate that existence of 
redistributional policies lower the level of social welfare for the host country. 
Developed countries typically prefer free trade over free labor migration, since the 
former allows them to enjoy gains of integration via trade without taking the burden 
of welfare decreasing effects caused by redistribution policies in the latter.
Razin and Sadka (1995) emphasize the same point by showing that when the 
migrants are allowed to benefit from various services of the welfare state, the cost of 
migration of unskilled labor to the host country may exceed the gains from migration 
for that country, thereby providing an anti-migration factor. They also argue that 
another anti-migration factor may result from rigidity of wages at the host country by 
showing that influx of unskilled labor may lower the total share of native workers in 
such a case.
The main contribution of this thesis is to show that age composition 
differences among countries suffice to provide incentives for international labor 
migration. Establishing this result in an overlapping generations framework is the 
first in the literamre to the best of our knowledge. Some of our results, such as the 
welfare implications of migration, are in line with the previous studies that explore 
migration using OLG models. Although incentives to migrate do remain in the long 
run, the steady state level of migration serves to equalize the states of countries 
without resulting the migration of whole population of one country to the other,
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contrary to Galor (1986) and Geide (1998). Incorporation o f free trade features to the 
model enables us to compare free migration with free trade from the perspective of a 
developed country and we conclude, like Razin and Sadka (1995) and Wellisch and 
Walz (1997), that preferring free trade over accepting migrants can be justified.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF AUTARKY
In this section, we describe the model under the assumption that there are no 
interactions between countries and concentrate on the behavior of certain variables 
that belong to a single country. Since our main concern is the effects of differences in 
age compositions resulting from differing population growth rates across countries, 
we consider values that certain variables attain under different population growth 
scenarios.
3.1.THE MODEL
The model used here is a 2-country, infinite horizon overlapping generations 
(OLG) model with perfect foresight. Since our purpose is to identify the effects of 
differences in age composition on flows of commodities and labor, the countries that 
we will consider (country A and country B) are exactly the same in every aspect, 
including the initial populations, except for the population growth rate, /j.'* Each of 
the countries is populated by 2-period living individuals who are homogenous not 
only intergenerationally but also intragenerationally.
'' Appendix-y4 includes a very simple proof that, of the two countries that initially have the same age 
composition, the one with a higher population growth rate will have a younger population in each 
period, except for the initial one (i.e., the share of youngs in total population will be higher in this 
country). This enables us to model the effect of differences in age composition by considering 
different n’s for different countries.
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At an arbitrary period t in time, two types of individuals will exist: ‘Young’s 
that are bom in period t and are living the first period of their lives, and ‘old’s that 
are bom in period t-I and are living the last period of their lives. The individuals 
work only when they are young, each inelastically supplying a fixed amount of labor, 
and retire in the second period of their lives. Production, exchange and payments are 
assumed to be made at the end of each period. So, a young bom in period t works in 
the same period, earns a wage of w, at the end of that period and decides how much 
to consume and how much to save. In period t+], he rents his savings, A,+i, to firms 
and earn , where r,+/ is the rental rate on capital in period /+ /. He consumes
all of (l + r „ ,) -4 , ,  in period t+1 since no intergenerational transfers (such as 
bequests, gifts, etc.) are allowed.
Let t], denote the number of individuals bom in period t. Assuming that only 
the young can bear children, one can write
(3.1)
where n denotes the population growth rate as noted before.^
For country i (i € {A,B)), the production sector and household consumption 
decisions are characterized as follows.
 ^ By this definition, (I+n) is the average number of children that each young bears. It is shown in 
Appendix-A that n is indeed equal to the population growth rate in the usual sense, i.e., the rate of 
increase in total number of people.
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3.1.1.Production Sector
There are two goods indexed by j (y e  {1,2}), both of which are produced 
according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas type production function 
which uses capital (K) and labor (L) as inputs. Good 1, which is used both for 
consumption purposes and as capital, is taken as numeriare. The price of good 2, 
which is used only for consumption, at time / is denoted by p,. Good 1 is the 
relatively more labor intensive good, while good 2 is relatively more capital 
intensive.^ Country i's capital stock in period t is denoted by Kl and its labor supply
is denoted by L',, where L', =tjI - I J  with I , representing the exogenous level of 
labor supplied by an individual.
All capital and labor available are divided between the two sectors such that
(3.2)
Z, — L^ , + Zji (3.3)
The production functions are defined as:
,I-or (3.4)
 ^ Taking the investment good as the labor intensive good is not common in literature, but not 
unrealistic. For example, consider wheat, which is used both for consumption and as capital, as good 1 
and toothpaste as good 2. Clearly, wheat may well be labor intensive whereas toothpaste more capital 
intensive, justifying our choice.
 ^ The index / denoting the country will be dropped in the rest of this section to avoid ambiguity of 
notation. Note that all variables will be defined for the same / unless noted otherwise.
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A·,, (3.5)
X  X
Letting ^  and x^ , =—— denote sectoral outputs per worker,
— K - Lk, = —- capital per worker, and noting that / = — , it follows that
n, 7,
Xu ={KY{h,l
\-a (3.6)
= { k . r { h . r (3.7)
where
Kt 2^/ “ (3.8)
h . + k = i (3.9)
The production sectors are assumed to be competitive so that the 
representative firm producing good 1 maximizes profits, ku by solving the problem
max;r„ = ( A : „ -r,  - A:,, -w , ·/„ s.t. A:,, > 0 , /„ > 0  (3.10)
kuJ,
The corresponding problem for the representative firm producing good 2, 
together with the first order conditions, yields
15
r, = a  · (t„ ^ . {k„ y-' (3.11)
(3.12)
Combining equations (3.8), (3.9), (3.11) and (3.12) we find
_d,l,-k,
Mi — (3.13)
l 2 . = l . - k -
K  -e,l, 
d, -e,
(3.14)
^  -  e  .  /  - g  .^ 1'^ U ‘l( d, -e,
(3.15)
^2/ ' ^ 2/
kj e, ·/,
d,-e,
(3.16)
where.
\ l - a j
(3.17)
(3.18)
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3.1.2.Household's Problem
An individual bom at time t has a utility function of the form:
l'--« (3.19)
where C, = (c ,„)^  denotes the utility gained from consumption when
young and C, |^ = Y  · denotes the utility gained from consumption
when old. For j=l, 2, Qy, denotes the amount of good j  consumed when young and 
Cjot+i denotes the amount of good j  consumed when old, all in per capita terms. The 
representative household solves the problem:
max U,
Q W W »Qof+l .Qoi+1
subject to (3.20)
^lv( + Pt ' ^2y, +
l^o(+l Pl*\ ■ 2^oi+\
\ + r
= w, - I (3.21)
/+1
where r,+; is the rationally anticipated return to capital in period t+1 and p,+i is the 
rationally anticipated price of good 2 in period t+1.
The solution to this problem results in the following decisions:
C,., =p-e-w,  ·/ (3.22)
17
c .  =
P,
(3.23)
(3.24)
( l - / i ) · ( l- 0)-w, ·/ -(l + r,^,)
•'20/+1
A+1
(3.25)
3.1.3.Solving the Model:
Since olds consume all their wealth in the current period, only capital 
transferred to the next period is the savings of the current young,* implying:
= 4.1 ={^ri-Ciy,-Pr  )· n, (3.26)
Dynamic equilibrium requires clearance of goods’ markets in each period t,
i.e.
^ \ t  ^  * ^ \ y t  ^ / - 1  * Q o / ‘/+1 (3.27)
2^, -C^y, + 7,-1 -C^o, (3.28)
* We assume that the olds who are alive the first period have some amount of initial endowment and 
they live only one period.
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Note that equations (3.27) and (3.28) imply each other by Walras’ law. 
Equation (3.28) results in
S - C , „ + — = --------  ^ ---------1 + Л P,
(3.29)
Combining (3.11), (3.12), (3.17), (3.18) and (3.29), enables us to express p, as 
a function p, = ф{к, ) of capital per worker k,.
3.2.THE RESULTS
We simulate this economy for a given production technology (i.e., given 
values of a and P), preferences (i.e., given values of ц and 0) and population growth 
rates; for certain values of initial per capita capital stock (Л,), labor per worker ( I )  
and initial per capita wealth of olds in the first period ( w ).^
We do this by considering the behavior o f variables k, and w, both on the 
transition path and at the steady state for two economies that are the same in every 
aspect except for population growth rates.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the time paths of k, for two countries A and В 
with «.4 = 0.05 and «B= 0.2.
’ The results that are reported here are from a simulation with a = 0.4, p = 0.5, 6 = 0.7, // = 0.4, / =1, 
k,= 1.0192, vv =0.8322.
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TIME PATH OP CAPITAL IN COUNTRY A TIME PATH O f  c a p i t a l  IN COUNTRY B
Figure 1 Figure 2
The countries start with the same initial conditions in period 1. Figure 3 
shows per capita capital stock in both countries starting from the second period 
onwards and until steady state is reached. It is clear from the figure that per capita 
capital stock in country A is greater than that in country B, at any point in time on the 
transition path as well as at the steady state.
TIME PATH OF CAPITAL IN BOTH COUNTRIES
Figure 3
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The corresponding graphs for wages in countries A and B are given in Figures
4 and 5.
TIME PATH OF WAGE RATE IN COUNTRY A TIME PATH OF WAGE RATE IN COUNTRY B
Figure 4 Figure 5
Figure 6 excludes period 1, which is identical in both countries, and compare 
wage rates in the following periods. Again, we see that wages in the low population 
growth country (A) are always greater than those in the high population growth 
country at any time.
TIME PATH OF WAGES IN BOTH COUNTRIES
Figure 6 
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Figures 7, 8 and 9 contain the corresponding graphs for rental rate on capital 
(r,) in both countries. As expected, return on capital is lower on the relatively capital 
abundant country (A) in each period, as well as on the steady state.
TIME PATH OF f1 IN COUNTRY A TIME PATH OF ft IN COUNTRY B
Figure 7 Figure 8
TIME PATH OF r1 IN BOTH COUNTRIES
Figure 9
If we concentrate on the steady state values of k, and w, corresponding to 
different values of n, we reach the following result;
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Steady state values of kt and w, are both decreasing functions of n, for given 
values of constants a, p, 0, n, / and initial conditions ^, ,vv. Figures 10 and 11 show 
this relationship between kt at the steady state and n\ and W/ at the steady state and n, 
respectively.
CHANGE OF STEADY STATE M WITH n CHANGE OF STEADY STATE wt WITH n
Figure 10 Figure 11
The steady state values of variables in both countries under autarky 
conditions are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
S te a d y  S ta te  V a l u e s C o u n t r y  A C oun t r y  B
k 0 . 1 5 49 0 .1244
w 0 . 2 7 10 0 .2488
r 1 .3175 1 .4983
u 0 . 1 1 78 0 .1124
Our results show that, if the two countries are exactly the same initially, 
country B (i.e. the one with the higher n) ends up with a younger population
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composition, lower k, and w, at the steady state when compared to country A. If full 
labor mobility between the two countries were allowed, one would expect a 
movement of labor from country B to country A, since the wage and utility 
differentials between these countries would provide an incentive for workers in B for 
migration to A. This migration and its consequences are discussed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
MIGRATION
In this chapter, we consider the results of allowing for labor mobility between 
these countries under two distinct scenarios. In the first scenario, the decision to 
migrate is based upon the difference between the lifetime utilities obtained in two 
countries and the migration is assumed to be from country B to country >4. In the 
second scenario, we allow for two-sided migration (i.e., either from 5  to ^  or from A 
to B in any given period) and the decision to migrate depends only on the wage 
difference. The process of migration, which is similar in both scenarios is as follows:
At time t, there are 2 kinds of new-born workers in the source country: 
Workers that are able to migrate (which we call mobile workers) and workers that 
are unable migrate. A mobile worker bom at time t decides on whether to migrate or 
not by considering the current state of the economy and the next two periods (in 
which he will live) under the assumption that none of his fellow coimtrymen will 
choose to migrate to the other country during his lifetime. Immediately after birth, a 
mobile worker evaluates the variables of concern (which are lifetime utilities in 
scenario 1 and wages in scenario 2 ) and compare the values that these variables 
would attain in both countries, had there been no migration. We call these "variables 
under no migration"'® and denote them by adding the superscript NM. If the
To avoid a possible confusion, we would like to clarify one point. The phrase “variables under no 
migration” does not mean that these values are calculated by assuming that there is no migration at all, 
which would have made them equal to the autarky values. Rather, it suggests that these values are 
calculated by counterfactually assuming that there will be no migration in the next two periods. Since 
the mobile worker knows the current state of both economies and uses this information, the effects of 
actual labor movement up to this period are implicitly taken into account in his decision.
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migration criteria is satisfied, the mobile workers will migrate from the source 
country to the receiving country and live both periods of their lives there. The ratio 
of mobile workers to the whole worker population in period t will be denoted by C/· h 
will be a function of in the first scenario and in the second
scenario, as explained below.
Note that the change in number of workers due to migration results in a 
change in the values of all variables in both countries, therefore the values that the 
workers use to make their decisions are not realized. Here, we relax the perfect 
foresight assumption by assuming that the value of Ct is not common knowledge, so 
that a mobile worker is unaware of the other workers' decisions. Simply put, a 
worker looks at the future of both countries and chooses one of them to live in, by 
realistically assuming that his choice would have a negligible effect in this future, 
without knowing and taking into account how many others are making the same 
decision as himself
4.1.MIGRATION SCENARIO 1
The decision rule in this scenario is based on lifetime utilities of workers in 
both coimtries that would have been realized if there had been no migration
^^ BNM j Ujjijifg Galor (1986) and Karayalcin (1994), where the workers from
country B migrate if Uf > U f , we assume that there is a fixed cost associated with
migrating permanently and the workers migrate only if the percentage increase in 
their utility is greater than a certain value. So, the decision rule for a mobile worker 
in country B is:
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Migrate if
Tj ASM ^  Tj BNM
U.BNM
>  T (4.1)
where t is an exogenously set constant. I I
The share of mobile workers in the generation bom at time t in country B is 
given by
^  U  BNM ^
ANM , TjBNM+ f/
(4.2)
where z and y are positive constants.
After the migration, worker population in country A becomes rjf + · rjf)
and the worker population in country B becomes (l -  ^ , ) · r jf , and the markets in 
both countries continue to work under autarky conditions.
Before moving on to the results of this scenario, we should note how the 
values of variables z and y characterize the process of migration. If the workers in 
country B are very reluctant to migrate (i.e. z is very small and/or y is very big), the 
resulting migration will be very small when compared to the aggregate populations, 
therefore will not have a big impact. At the other extreme, if the workers in country 
B have a great tendency to migrate (with a very big value for z and/or y very small), a 
small difference in utilities may induce a large wave of migrants, radically change
" T is taken as 0.01 in the simulation.
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the number of workers in both countries and cause huge jumps in the values of 
variables, which is not a case that we are willing to consider. We stay away from 
these extremes and we z=l and y=1.5. The resulting steady state values in both 
coimtries are given in Table 2.
Table 2
M I G R A T I O N  1 A U T A R K Y
Steady State Values A B A B
k 0.1246 0.1246 0.1549 0.1244
w 0.2489 0.2489 0.2710 0.2488
r 1.4969 1.4969 1.3175 1.4982
u 0.1124 0.1124 0.1178 0.1124
Population Growth Rate 0.1989 0.1989
EFFECTIVE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IN COUNTRY A EFFECTIVE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IN COUNTRY B
Figure 12 Figure 13
One important result we obtain is that migration continues at the steady state 
with value of ^  converging to a specific value (0.00090 in this simulation) which 
equalizes population growth rates in both countries. This result is different from the
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results of the Galor (1986), who, in a different setting, modeled a migration scheme 
which results in whole population of a country migrating to another country. Time 
paths of population growth rates in both countries are given in Figures 12 and 13.
We may interpret the resulting steady state as the case o f two countries under 
autarky conditions, each with a population growth rate o f 0.1989. This is very close 
to ns = 0.2, as expected, since country B's population grows so large when compared 
to country A that only a small portion of its increment is enough to equalize the 
population growth rates. Still, the effective population growth rate (which is the after 
migration population growth rate) in country B is less than the autarky case and the 
residents of country B are slightly better off’^  with higher utility, wage rate and per 
capita capital stock at each period. However, the migrants in the early periods 
benefit a great deal.
A COMPARISON OF UTILITIES OF MIGRANTS AND NONMIGRANTS
Figure 14
In this simulation, the percentage increase in utility of a resident of country B is on the order of 
0.01%.
29
Figure 14 shows the graphs of lifetime utility of a migrant to country A and 
the lifetime utility of a worker staying at country B. While these converge to the 
same level at the steady state, the benefit of the migrants in early periods are clearly 
visible in the figure.
Obviously, residents of country A experience an effective population growth 
rate that is much higher than nA = 0.05 and are made worse off in each period as well 
as in steady state as a consequence of facing smaller kt, w, and Ui values.
4.2.MIGRATION SCENARIO 2
In this scenario, we allow for bilateral migration with decision criteria being 
the "wages under no migration" in both countries. So, the decision rule is:
( I )If > w¡BUM Migration is from Bio A C  = ^
( II )if > w;Am Migration is from A to B
r am -w ,ANM Y
(4.3)
The results of this scenario is given in Table 3, with which is the rate of 
migration from Aio B being 0 at all times and if, the rate of migration from B to A 
converging to 0.00422 at the steady state.
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Table 3
M I G R A T I O N  2 A U T A R K Y
Steady State Values B B
0.1252 0.1252 0.1549 0.1244
w 0.2494 0.2494 0.2710 0.2488
1.4921 1.4921 1.3175 1.4982
0.1126 0.1126 0.1178 0.1124
Population Growth Rate 0.1949 0.1949
First thing to note is that the qualitative results are same in both migration 
scenarios. This is due to the fact that we restrict the migration process to be a smooth 
one, i.e. one that does not cause large jumps in population compositions. As a result, 
the gap between the wages in both countries decreases gradually and finally 
disappears. Note that.
which is the case at the steady state. Therefore, wages in country B can never pass 
the wages in country A, causing the migration to be one sided in practice, even 
though migration in the opposite direction is theoretically possible.
Making a comparison between two migration scenarios is not meaningful, 
since the relative positions of the countries in steady state under these two different 
scenarios depend on the initial states. The important point here is that comparing 
either migration scenario with autarky cases (and the trade scenarios as we will 
explain in the next chapter) gives the same results.
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CHAPTER 5
TRADE
In this chapter, we examine the results of trade between these two countries 
under the assumption that both countries are equal in size initially. A second trade 
scenario where country A is taken to be a large country (in the same sense as used in 
the trade literature) and country B is taken to be a small country is discussed in 
Appendix B.
A natural result of free trade will be the equalization of prices in both 
countries in each period so
V/ (5.2)
In the present version of our model, we do not allow for foreign direct 
investment and factor movements between countries. However, given that good 1 is 
used for both consumption and investment purposes, capital stock at time t comes 
from good 1 produced at time t-1. Therefore, while installed capital itself is immobile 
between countries, some of good 1 traded in the previous period may be used as 
capital in the current period.
The capital abundant country (country A) specializes in the production of the 
relatively more capital intensive good (good 2 ) and exports it, while the labor
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abundant country (country B) specializes in the production o f and exports the 
relatively more labor intensive good (good 1).
Instead of market clearing conditions in each country (as in the autarky case), 
we require that world-wide demand to both goods is equal to the world-wide supply, 
meaning that the amount of good 2 (good 1) that country A exports (imports) is equal 
to the amount of good 2 (good 1) that country B imports (exports). This requires that 
the following equations hold.
x ,^ + k :^  -  -  Tif ■ c  -  7,1. · C  = rif ■ C  + · c l ,  + Kl,  -  X l  -  K f  (5.3)
\ r  A A f-^A A ^ A    b . B y-B
^ 2 /  V / ’ ^2jy/ V i-1  '^ 2 o i  “ V / *^2>'r V /-1  ' ^ 2 o t  ^ 2 / (5.4)
enabling us to determine the world price once k f  and k f  are known. The resulting 
steady state values for both countries are reported in Table 4.
Table 4
T R A D E A U T A R K Y
steady State Values A B A B
k 0.1422 0.1244 0.1549 0.1244
w 0.2488 0.2488 0.2710 0.2488
r 1.4983 1.4983 1.3175 1.4982
u 0.1124 0.1124 0.1178 0.1 124
P 1.2210 1.2210 1.1951 1.2210
Total Exports of Good 1 0 44.1316
Total Imports ofGood 1 44.1316 0
Total Exports ofGood 2 36.1432 0
Total Im ports of Good 2 0 36.1432
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We see that all o f the variables in country B converge to their steady-state 
autarky values. Wages, rental rates, prices and utility in country A have the same 
steady state values as country B. Capital per worker in A is higher than that o f B, but 
it is smaller than the value it would have attained under autarky. The results indicate 
that, in the long run, country B behaves as if  it were a large country, while country A 
becomes and acts like a small country. This is due to the large population difference 
that occurs between A and B over time. Resulting from the high population growth 
rate in country B, this population difference between the two countries grows bigger 
as time passes. Although country A is advantageous in terms of per capita variables, 
its aggregate production and demand remains very small when compared to 
aggregate production and demand of country B. After a certain time, country A ’s 
contribution to the world economy becomes negligible, so the results obtained by 
solving the model for the world become nearly the same as the results obtained by 
solving only for coimtry B. This means that although we did not require any country 
to be large in the beginning, the difference in demographics cause country B to 
practically become the large country.
A COMPARISON OP M OP A
Figure 15 Figure 16
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Figure 15 contains a graph comparing the time path of k f  under autarky and 
under the trade scenario. Comparison of time paths of k f  in these two cases is given 
in Figure 16 which plots the difference between k f  imder the trade scenario and k f  
under autarky {kf^'‘“‘‘ -  k f^“'"'^') better inspection. Similar plots comparing lifetime 
utilities in both countries are given in Figures 17 and 18.
A COMPARISON OF Ut of A A COMPARISON OF Ut of B
Figure 17 Figure 18
In the initial periods, where the effect o f the differences in population growth 
rates are relatively small, country B actually benefits from trade, as in the previous 
scenario. Trading with country A, which has higher kt and tower p,, results in lower 
prices and higher capital per worker for country B during the initial stages of 
transition. However, the effect of the difference between population growth rates 
induces country B to start behaving as a large country after some time and therefore 
diminishes the benefits of trade for that country. The effect of population growth 
differences grow stronger as time passes, totally dominating the process eventually 
and causing the values of all variables in country B to converge to their autarky 
values.
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When we compare the current trade scenario with the one presented in 
Appendix B (i.e., the one where country A is the large country), we see that the one 
in Appendix B is more realistic in two main aspects. First o f all, the scenario 
presented here results in a net welfare loss for country A, implying that this country 
will have no intention to take part in such a trade in the first place. One justification 
of such a scenario may be a case where country A faces a choice between trading 
with country B and accepting migrants from country B. I f  country A has no other 
means of avoiding full labor mobility between these countries (as in the European 
Union), it may be willing to bear the burden of such a trade if the consequences of 
migration are more severe for it.
However, when we compare the case of migration with that o f trade, we see 
that the argument in favor of the trade scenario can not be Justified immediately. 
Figure 19 clearly shows that the residents o f country A are also better off under 
migration scenario 1 on the transition path as well as at the steady state. However, 
the difference in steady state values is too small to provide a basis for a clear-cut 
decision, so that we can consider them as equal and this may lead to a justification of 
the current trade scenario. The fact is that most o f the social factors that are non­
existent in our model (such as cultural differences, increasing crime rates, etc.) do 
not favor accepting migrants. This may motivate country A to engage in trade with 
coimtry B to avoid migrants, since the economic outcome for country A would be the 
same in the long run.
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Figure 19
Of course, if country A is actually a large country when compared to country 
B, the trade would take place and would not cause a welfare loss for either country 
(see Appendix B). In such a case, the equalization o f prices would eliminate the 
motive for migration, with country B moving up to the level o f country A rather than 
country A moving down to the level of country B, which would happen in the case of 
migration.
Trade scenario in Appendix B has another advantage over the one in this 
chapter in terms of its relevance to real life examples o f the issue under 
consideration. When we consider such examples (such as EU vs. Turkey, USA vs. 
Mexico), we see that country that we model as A has a much bigger aggregate 
economy than that of country B. Therefore taking country .,4 as a large country 
becomes a much more realistic assumption.
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these modifications have absolutely no effect in the autarky case, they may turn out 
to be important in a trade scenario, where the relative sizes of populations affect the 
outcome in a particular period. However, such an effect does not exist in the long 
run. We observe that the steady state values of the per capita variables are completely 
unaffected and turn out be equal to the values reported in Table 5.
Clearly, as time passes, the effect caused by differences in population growth 
rates dominate the effect of initial population differences. As a result, the initial 
population compositions may weaken (or strengthen if initial population of country B 
is bigger) the effect of n’s, alter the time path and change the length of the transition 
period until the steady state is reached, but have no effect on the level of steady state 
values of variables.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we examined the effects o f differing population growth rates 
and resulting age composition differences across countries on the migration and trade 
patterns. We considered two countries that have the same initial conditions and 
exactly the same properties except for the population growth rates, and compared the 
time paths and steady state values of variables like capital per worker, wage rate, rate 
of return to capital and lifetime utility. We showed that a difference in population 
growth rates is enough to provide incentives for flow of labor and/or commodities 
across countries. We modeled international labor migration and examined its effects 
on both the source and the host country. International trade is also modeled under 
two different assumptions (with and without allowing for one o f the countries to be 
large) and the consequences of trade are compared with those of migration.
Before moving on to our main results regarding migration and the 
comparison of trade and migration scenarios, we briefly comment on the autarky 
cases. Since the countries start with exactly the same initial conditions, the values of 
variables for both of them are the same at the end of the first period. At the beginning 
of the second period, while they continue to have the same total capital, population 
(and hence, labor supply) in country B becomes higher than country A, causing 
capital per worker in country A to rise above country B. As a result, country B 
becomes the labor abundant country with a comparative advantage in producing the 
relatively more labor intensive good (good 1). Country A, on the other hand, turns
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into the capital abundant country with a comparative advantage in producing the 
relatively more capital intensive good (good 2 ), as reflected by the difference 
between the relative prices in both countries.'^
The simulation results suggest that the wage rate and capital per worker are 
lower in country B (where labor is abundant), while the return on capital is lower in 
country A (where capital is abundant). Moreover, the representative consumer in 
country A always attains a higher level of lifetime utility than his counterpart in 
country B.
The first result that we obtain from migration scenarios is that the two 
scenarios are the same in practice. The difference between these scenarios is that 
migration scenario 1 only allows for one-sided migration (from B to A) whereas two- 
sided migration is theoretically possible in migration scenario 2. However, the two 
scenarios become essentially the same if no incentive to migrate from B Xo A arises 
(i.e., if the wage rate in B never exceeds that in A), which is exactly what happens in 
the present simulation. This is due to the restriction that the migration scheme we 
consider be a smooth one so as not to observe discontinuity in the values of 
variables, which is a fairly realistic restriction. This migration scheme does not lead 
to any irregularities such as a large amount of people migrating in one period 
followed by no migration in the next period, as instantaneous jumps are ruled out. 
Given that the wages in A are initially higher than those in B, if the wages in B were 
ever to exceed A, they should first become equal (or at least sufficiently close). At 
first, the large difference between wf and wf (in favor of A) provides a big
A similar argument applies to all periods, meaning that country A should always have comparative 
advantage in producing more capital intensive good, which is indeed the result of the simulation.
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incentive for migration from B to A. As the system moves closer to steady state, the 
difference between wf and wf gradually decreases, reducing the incentive to
migrate. At the steady state when wf and wf become virtually equal (note that there 
is still incentive to migrate from B to A since ), the amount of
migration is not enough to push wa lower than wb. Therefore, no migration from A to 
B ever occurs, reducing the effects observed under migration scenario 2 to those 
observed imder migration scenario 1 .
Another important result obtained from the migration scenarios is the 
convergence of the rate of migrating workers in country 5  to a value that equalizes 
population growth rates in both countries at the steady state. This result is 
significantly different than Galor (1986), where the migration does not affect wages 
causing the incentive to migrate to persist on the adjustment path. This, in turn, 
results in the migration of the whole population of one country to the other. In our 
model, migration serves to equalize relative prices and factor prices. The welfare 
effects are in line with Galor (1986) and Karayal9 in (1999) in that the host country 
gets worse-off while the source country remains at least as well-off (becomes slightly 
better-off to be exact).
One feature of the adjustment path in migration scenarios is that the length of 
the transition period is much longer than that of the autarky cases. This causes the 
resulting common population growth rate (0.1989 in scenario 1 and 0.1949 in 
scenario 2) to be very close to hb, which is 0.2. Since the ratio o f the youngs bom in 
country B to those bom in country A grows larger and larger over time, the length of 
the path to steady state makes the movement of only a small portion of youngs in B
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sufficient to equalize population growth rates across countries. As a result, citizens of 
A incur a great welfare loss due to the migration while the welfare of citizens of B at 
the steady state is almost the same under autarky and migration. This, however does 
not suggest that the migrants’ decisions to migrate are without justification. The time 
paths of the welfare o f the migrants and the non-migrants show that the migrants 
benefit greatly from migrating, especially in the initial periods.
We also see that we were not mistaken to assume that individuals decide 
whether to migrate or not by comparing the “imder no migration” values o f utilities 
(or wages in migration scenario 2 ) and ignore the fact that these values would not be 
realized after migration. While the individuals do ignore some effects by doing so 
and the improvements in their welfare turn out to be smaller than they anticipated, 
they are stilt better-off as compared to the non-migrants, justifying that they were 
right to decide in favor of migrating in the first place.
Our trade scenarios exhibit the usual characteristics of Heckscher-Ohlin type 
models with each country specializing in and exporting the good in the production of 
which it has a comparative advantage and importing the other good. Before moving 
on to the more interesting case of the comparison o f results of trade scenarios with 
those of migration scenarios, we would like to comment on a few things.
Clearly, results of trade scenario in chapter 5 imply a Pareto deterioration for 
country A and are contrary to a common result in the trade literature which suggests 
that none of the parties involved in international trade should face welfare losses. 
This result might have changed if we had considered compensation schemes or 
transfer payments between countries. Some studies using OLG models, such as
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Kemp and Wong (1995) and Roy and Rassouli (1991), argue that the absence o f 
these mechanisms may result in free trade being inferior to autarky. Bohm and 
Keiding (1985) also present an OLG model with inflation where all agents o f one 
country are made worse off under free trade. However, the real reason behind the 
welfare loss in our trade scenario is that country A is essentially forced to act as a 
small country in the long run and take the prices realized in country B because of the 
significantly faster population growth in this country. This increases the relative 
price in country A while the wages fail to compensate the effect o f this increase. This 
result is in line with Galor (1988a, 1988b), who suggest that free trade may cause a 
Pareto deterioration for a small country in the absence of international transactions in 
financial assets.
Since migration is also Pareto inferior to autarky, the best solution for country 
A seems to close its borders to both labor and good movements if it is not a large 
country. A possible reason for not doing so may be country A’s inability to prevent 
legal (which would probably be the case should Turkey be accepted as a full member 
by the EU) or illegal (which is the case between Mexico and the U.S.) migration of 
labor. What country A may do instead may be to try to eliminate motives for 
migration by engaging in trade with country B. (We would like to remind that one of 
the arguments raised in the U.S. in defense of NAFTA was that it would slow down 
labor migration from Mexico to the U.S. by increasing wages in Mexico.)
At a first glance, engaging in trade to avoid migration does not seem to be a 
rational choice for country .,4 , if it does not have the power o f imposing its own prices 
as a large country, as in the scenario in chapter 5. While migration, which pushes 
country A close to the welfare level of country B under autarky and causes a net
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welfare loss, is bad for this country, trade is worse in this case, pushing country A 
even more (towards what is almost exactly the autarky welfare level o f country B) 
and causing a larger welfare loss.
However, it should be noted that the values o f variables at steady state under 
the two scenarios are fairly close to each other, with the utility under trade scenario 
of Chapter 5 being only 0.01% less than that of migration scenario. Therefore, 
claiming that the economic analysis clearly favors migration over trade is not 
possible, considering the infinitesimal difference. If political and social factors 
heavily favor trade over migration (and they almost always do), a government may 
be willing to bear this small burden instead of dealing with the potential problems of 
migration, such as hostility against migrants due to a number of social and cultural 
differences, opposition of labor unions to the inflow of cheap labor, etc.. Moreover, 
the economic factors that we do not take into account in our model may be increasing 
the cost of accepting migrants. Wellisch and Walz (1998) and Razin and Sadka 
(1992) emphasize the importance of redistribution policies''* and claim that accepting 
migrants who often work in low-wage jobs increases the bimden of social protection 
policies. In such a case, coimtry A may actually be better-off by preferring trade over 
migration if the extra burden of trade on the population is less than the extra burden 
of immigrants on the government budget. Of course, this issue requires fiirther 
inspection, probably using a model like that in Wellisch and Walz (1998). However, 
we can safely say that arguments supporting trade over migration are at least as good 
as the opposing arguments, if not better, even when the actual trade scenario is the 
one in Chapter 5.
Data in Wellisch and Walz (1998) suggest that social protection expenditures correspond to 1/3 to 
1/2 of government expenditure in the U.S., Germany and EU (as a whole).
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If the relevant trade scenario is the one we considered in Appendix B, i.e., if 
country A is actually a large country whereas country B is small, the choice between 
trade and migration is much easier. In this case, trade Pareto dominates migration by 
improving the welfare o f country B to the autarky level in country B without causing 
any decrease in the welfare level of country A. Not only country A gets better off 
than it would have been under migration scenario, but country B also gets better off 
than it would have been under autarky or the migration scenarios.
We can say that while both migration and trade equalizes factor prices and 
relative prices in both coimtries, they are by no means substitutes (especially when 
one of the countries is large) and the low-population-growth country prefers trading 
with the other coimtry rather than accepting migrants from it.
Further study on the issue may consist of inclusion of government to study 
the effects of migration on government policies, such as tax rates, tax revenue, social 
redistribution expenditures, etc.. The case of temporary migration seems quite 
straight-forward and not expected to provide greater insight. Even though 
endogenizing the length of stay o f migrant workers in the foreign country (which 
would require a model with a larger number of cohorts) or introducing a probability 
of return to home country could make the model more realistic, the main results 
presented here are not expected to change.
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APPENDIX-A
POPULATION GROWTH RATE, AGE COMPOSITION AND n
Assume that at an arbitrary period t, there are number o f olds in country
j. By definition, there are (l + n)-riQi^  ^ youngs at that period. In period /+7, there are 
(l + «) · olds and (l + «)^ · if old youngs. So the population growth rate is
Population Growth Rate _ ((l + · loLD 0 ’ loLD )~ {Hold + (l + · 'Hold ) _
^OLD + (l + w) · rjoLD
_ (l + /i)^  - 1 _  (2 + n)·/1 _ 
~ (l + « )+ l  "  1 + n
= n (A.1)
Also at an arbitrary period t, ratio of yoxmgs in the population would be
Ratio of Yoimgs in Population = 7— — = ----i - — (A.2)
+ n)· Wold + Wold (1 + «)+1 i +  J _
l + n
Clearly, this ratio is increasing in n, meaning that of the 2 countries with the 
same initial conditions, the one with the greater n will have a younger population 
each period.
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APPENDIX-B
TRADE SCENARIO 2
When country A is taken to be ‘large’ and country B ‘small’, relative prices 
observed in country A will directly be transmitted to coxmtry B. Since the effects o f 
trade on the values of variables in country A will be negligible in such a case, period 
t prices in A will be
(5.1)
where k f  is the capital per worker in coimtry A. As prices in country B will also 
move to make p f  = p f  = ), other variables in both countries will be determined
according to this common relative price.
However, it is not possible to simulate such a case with the values that we use 
in the previous parts. To highlight the effects of the difference between and ns, we 
had chosen two coimtries with a large difference between the population growth 
rates. While such a difference is not unrealistically large, it is still large enough to 
cause the aggregate economy in country B to grow extremely large when compared 
to that of country So, even if  we start from a situation where country ^ 4 is the large 
country, the difference in population growth rates would soon offset this effect, 
making it impossible to analyze a case where country A remains a large country for a 
reasonable period of time. To smdy such a case, we consider two countries with
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distinct but relatively close population growth rates, with 0.05 and hb 0.08. By 
this way, country A will remain to be a large country, once it starts as one, enabling 
us to compare the results with that of autarky. Note that country A again exports 
good 2 and imports good 1 and the relative prices in A do increase. However, since A 
is the large country, its per capita exports and imports are so small that they become 
negligible, causing the increase in pa to be negligible as well.
Table 5 reports the steady state values of all variables for both countries. 
Country 5 ’s taking o f the prices in coimtry A results in the same level o f wages, 
rental rates and utilities at the steady state in both countries, which are equal to those 
of autarky case in country A. Country B ends up with lower rental rates and prices 
and higher wages and utility as compared to the autarky case.
Table 5
T R A D E A U T A R K Y
Steady State Values A B A B
k 0.1549 0.1355 0.1549 0.1244
w 0.2710 0.2710 0.2710 0.2488
r 1.3175 1.3175 1.3175 1.4982
u 0.1178 0.1 178 0.1178 0.1124
P 1.1952 1.1952 1.1951 1.2210
Total Exports of Good 1 0 44.1316
T Ota I Im ports of Good 1 44.1316 0
Total Exports of Good 2 36.1432 0
Total Imports of Good 2 0 36.1432
A graph of capital per worker in country A and coxintry B in autarky and 
country B under trade scenario 2 are given in Figure 20. We see that while trade is
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enough to equalize other variables o f concern, kt in country B remains lower than that 
of country/4. However, there is still an improvement in country 5  when compared to 
its autarky case. Clearly, this scenario induces a Pareto improvement over the 
autarky case by clearly improving the welfare of country B without causing a 
deterioration in the welfare of country/4.
A COM PARISON OF Kt OF B AND A IN THE CURRENT SCENARIO
Figure 20
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